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MANSMANN,  Circuit Judge. 
 In this case of first impression for this circuit, we 
have before us a petition filed by one parent against the other 
under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction.  Edward M. Feder asserts that Melissa Ann Evans-
Feder "wrongfully retained" their son, Charles Evan Feder 
("Evan"), in the United States and requests that Evan be returned 
to him in Australia.  Concluding that the United States was 
Evan's "habitual residence", Hague Convention, Article 3a, the 
district court held that the retention was not wrongful and 
denied Mr. Feder's petition. 
 We, however, conclude that Australia was Evan's 
habitual residence and hold that Mrs. Feder's0 retention of Evan 
was wrongful within the meaning of the Convention.  We will 
therefore vacate the district court's denial of Mr. Feder's 
petition and remand the case for a determination as to whether 
the exception that Mrs. Feder raises to the Convention's general 
rule of return applies to preclude the relief Mr. Feder seeks. 
 
I. 
 We begin by reviewing the evidence presented in this 
case.  The facts as found by the district court leading to Mrs. 
Feder's retention of Evan are not in dispute. 
                                                           
0
 Although the caption reads "Evans-Feder", Melissa Ann 
Evans-Feder refers to herself in her brief as "Mrs. Feder" and we 
adopt that designation. 
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 Mr. and Mrs. Feder are American citizens who met in 
1987 in Germany where each was working:  she as an opera singer, 
and he as an employee of Citibank.  Evan, their only child, was 
born in Germany on July 3, 1990.   
 In October, 1990, the family moved to Jenkintown, 
Pennsylvania because Mr. Feder had accepted a management position 
with CIGNA in Philadelphia.  When CIGNA terminated Mr. Feder's 
employment in June of 1993, he began exploring other employment 
opportunities, including a position with the Commonwealth Bank of 
Australia.  Although Mr. Feder greeted the possibility of living 
and working in Australia with enthusiasm, Mrs. Feder approached 
it with considerable hesitation.  Nonetheless, that August, the 
Feders traveled to Australia to evaluate the opportunity, and 
while there, toured Sydney, the city where Mr. Feder would work 
if he were to accept the position with Commonwealth Bank.  They 
spoke with Americans who had moved to Australia, consulted an 
accountant about the financial implications of living in 
Australia and met with a relocation consultant and real estate 
agents regarding housing and schools.  Mrs. Feder also spoke with 
a representative of the Australia Opera about possible employment 
for herself. 
 In late August or early September of 1993, the 
Commonwealth Bank offered Mr. Feder the position of General 
Manager of its Personal Banking Department.  Finding the offer 
satisfactory from a professional and financial standpoint, Mr. 
Feder was prepared to accept it.  Mrs. Feder, on the other hand, 
was reluctant to move to Australia.  She had deep misgivings 
4 
about the couple's deteriorating marital relationship; in 
October, 1993, she consulted with a domestic relations attorney 
regarding her options, including a divorce.  Nevertheless, for 
both emotional and pragmatic reasons, Mrs. Feder decided in favor 
of keeping the family together and agreed to go to Australia, 
intending to work toward salvaging her marriage. 
 Upon Mr. Feder's acceptance of the bank's offer, the 
Feders listed their Jenkintown house for sale and sold numerous 
household items that would not be of use in Australia.  Toward 
the end of October, 1993, Mr. Feder went to Australia to begin 
work.  Mrs. Feder remained behind with Evan to oversee the sale 
of their house in Jenkintown; Mr. Feder, in the meantime, looked 
for a house to buy in the Sydney area, sending pictures and video 
tapes of houses to Mrs. Feder for her consideration.  In November 
of 1993, Mr. Feder purchased, in both his and Mrs. Feder's name, 
a 50% interest in a house in St. Ives, New South Wales, as a 
"surprise birthday present" for his wife.0   
 Mr. Feder returned to Pennsylvania on December 13, 
1993.  Even though the Jenkintown house had not sold, Mr. Feder 
arranged for a moving company to ship the family's furniture to 
Australia and bought airline tickets to Australia for Mrs. Feder 
and Evan.  The Feders left for Australia on January 3, 1994, 
where they arrived on January 8, 1994, after stopping briefly in 
California and Hawaii.  Mrs. Feder was ambivalent about the move; 
                                                           
0
 The Commonwealth Bank purchased the remaining 50% 
interest and financed the Feder's interest in the house. 
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while she hoped her marriage would be saved, she was not 
committed to remaining in Australia.   
 Once in Australia, the Feders finalized the purchase of 
their St. Ives house, but lived in a hotel and apartment for 
about four and one-half months while Mrs. Feder supervised 
extensive renovations to the house.  Evan attended nursery school 
three days a week and was enrolled to begin kindergarten in 
February, 1995.  Mrs. Feder applied to have Evan admitted to a 
private school when he reached the fifth grade, some seven years 
later.  Although Evan is not an Australian citizen and was not a 
permanent resident at the time, Mrs. Feder represented to the 
contrary on the school application. 
 In an effort to acclimate herself to Australia, Mrs. 
Feder pursued the contacts she had made during the Feders' 
August, 1993 trip and auditioned for the Australian Opera 
Company.  She accepted a role in one of the company's 
performances set for February, 1995, which was scheduled to begin 
rehearsals in December, 1994. 
 Mr. Feder changed his driver's license registration 
from Pennsylvania to Australia before legally obligated to do so 
and completed the paperwork necessary to obtain permanent 
residency for the entire family; Mrs. Feder did not surrender her 
Pennsylvania license nor submit to the physical examination or 
sign the papers required of those seeking permanent residency 
status.  All of the Feders obtained Australian Medicare cards, 
giving them access to Australia's health care system.   
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 According to Mrs. Feder, her marriage worsened in 
Australia.  In the early spring of 1994, she and Mr. Feder 
discussed her unhappiness in the marriage as well as her desire 
to return to the United States.  Mr. Feder attributed the 
couple's difficulties to the stress of his new job and requested 
that Mrs. Feder stay in Australia, anticipating that their 
problems would subside once the family moved into their new home. 
Once again, for both personal and practical reasons, Mrs. Feder 
agreed.   
 The family moved into the St. Ives home in May, 1994; 
the Feders' relationship, however, did not improve.  Ultimately, 
Mrs. Feder decided to leave her husband and return to the United 
States with Evan.  Believing that Mr. Feder would not consent to 
her plans if her true intent were known, Mrs. Feder told Mr. 
Feder that she wanted to take Evan on a visit to her parents in 
Waynesboro, Pennsylvania in July.  Mr. Feder made arrangements 
for the trip, buying two round-trip tickets for departure to the 
United States on June 29 and returning to Australia on August 2. 
 Mrs. Feder and Evan left Australia as scheduled and 
upon their arrival in the United States stayed with her parents. 
In July, 1994, Mr. Feder traveled to the United States on 
business, and arranged to meet his wife and son at their still 
unsold house in Jenkintown.  When Mr. Feder went to the house on 
July 20, 1994, he was served with a complaint that Mrs. Feder had 
filed in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania on July 14, 1994, seeking a divorce, property 
distribution, custody of Evan and financial support.  Shortly 
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thereafter, Mr. Feder returned to Australia and Mrs. Feder and 
Evan moved into the Jenkintown house. 
 In September, 1994, Mr. Feder commenced a proceeding in 
the Family Court of Australia in Sydney, applying for, inter 
alia, declarations under the Hague Convention on the Civil 
Aspects of International Child Abduction.  On October 4, 1994, 
the Judicial Registrar of the Family Court of Australia heard 
argument and issued an opinion declaring that Evan, Mr. Feder and 
Mrs. Feder were habitual residents of Australia immediately prior 
to Mrs. Feder's retention of Evan in the United States; that Mr. 
Feder had joint rights of custody of Evan under Australian law 
and was exercising those rights at the time of Evan's retention; 
and that Mrs. Feder's retention of Evan was wrongful within the 
meaning of the Convention.0   
 On September 28, 1994, Mr. Feder commenced this action 
against Mrs. Feder by filing a petition pursuant to the 
Convention in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, alleging that his parental custody 
rights had been violated by Mrs. Feder's "wrongful removal and/or 
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 Mrs. Feder was served with the Judicial Registrar's 
opinion on October 7, 1994.  Mrs. Feder did not enter an 
appearance in the Australian court, although the record indicates 
that she received notice of the proceeding.  In his brief, Mr. 
Feder informs us that the Australian action is pending and 
includes a request on his part for custody of Evan. 
 
 In the district court, Mr. Feder requested that "full 
faith and credit" be extended to the Judicial Registrar's 
declaration that Evan was a habitual resident of Australia.  The 
court refused Mr. Feder's request.  Feder v. Evans-Feder, 866 F. 
Supp. 860, 866 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  This issue was not raised on 
appeal. 
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retention"0 of Evan and requesting the child's return.  Mrs. 
Feder opposed the petition, denying that Evan's removal from 
Australia and retention in the United States were wrongful and 
asserting that even if they were, Evan cannot be returned to 
Australia because there is a "grave risk" that his return will 
expose him to "physical or psychological harm" or place him in an 
"intolerable situation."   
 On October 14, 1994, the district court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing and on October 31, 1994, issued an opinion 
and order denying Mr. Feder's petition.  Feder v. Evans-Feder, 
866 F. Supp. 860 (E.D. Pa. 1994).  Concluding that Mr. Feder 
failed to prove that "Evan's habitual residence in the United 
States as of January 8, 1994 had changed to Australia by the time 
Mrs. Feder refused to return him from Pennsylvania in the summer 
of 1994[,]" the court held that "the habitual residence of 
Charles Evan Feder is in the United States and that his mother 
has not wrongfully retained him here."  Id. at 868.  The court's 
holding was based on the view that although "Mr. Feder may have 
considered and even established Australia as his habitual 
residence by June of 1994 . . ., Mrs. Feder assuredly did not[,]" 
as "she never developed a settled purpose to remain [there]." Id.  
                                                           
0
 According to the Hague International Child Abduction 
Convention; Text and Legal Analysis found at Pub. Notice 957, 51 
Fed. Reg. 10494 (1986), "`wrongful removal' refers to the taking 
of a child from the person who was actually exercising custody of 
the child.  `Wrongful retention' refers to the act of keeping the 
child without consent of the person who was actually exercising 
custody."  Id. at 10503.  Since Mr. Feder consented to Mrs. 
Feder's removing Evan from Australia to the United States, but 
did not consent to the child's being retained there, we view this 
case as involving an alleged "wrongful retention". 
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Because of its decision regarding Evan's habitual residence, the 
court did not reach the merits of Mrs. Feder's claim that Evan's 
return to Australia would place him at risk.  Id.  This appeal 
followed. 
 
II. 
 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction reflects a universal concern about 
the harm done to children by parental kidnapping and a strong 
desire among the Contracting States to implement an effective 
deterrent to such behavior.  Hague Convention, Preamble; 42 
U.S.C. § 11601(a)(1)-(4).  Both the United States and Australia 
are signatory nations.  The United States Congress implemented 
the Convention in the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 11601 et seq., expressly recognizing its 
"international character" and the "need for uniform international 
interpretation" of its provisions.  42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(2), 
(3)(B).  In Australia, the Convention was implemented by the 
Family Law (Child Abduction Convention) Regulations made pursuant 
to s 111B of the Family Law Act 1975. 
 The Convention's approach to the phenomenon of 
international child abduction is straightforward.  It is designed 
to restore the "factual" status quo which is unilaterally altered 
when a parent abducts a child and aims to protect the legal 
custody rights of the non-abducting parent.0  Pub. Notice 957, 51 
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 The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction does not settle custody disputes, 
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Fed. Reg. 10494, 10505 (1986).  Thus, the cornerstone of the 
Convention is the mandated return of the child to his or her 
circumstances prior to the abduction if one parent's removal of 
the child from or retention in a Contracting State has violated 
the custody rights of the other, and is, therefore, "wrongful". 
Hague Convention, Article 12.0  The general rule of return, 
however, has exceptions.  If, for example, "there is a grave risk 
that [a child's] return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable 
situation[,]" return is not mandatory.  Hague Convention, Article 
13b.    
 Under Article 3 of the Convention, the removal or 
retention of a child is "wrongful" where: 
a  it is in breach of rights of custody 
attributed to a person, an institution or any 
other body, either jointly or alone, under 
the law of the State in which the child was 
habitually resident immediately before the 
removal or retention; and 
 
b  at the time of removal or retention those 
rights were actually exercised, either 
jointly or alone, or would have been so 
exercised but for the removal or retention. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
stating that "[a] decision under this Convention concerning the 
return of the child shall not be taken to be a determination on 
the merits of any custody issue."  Hague Convention, Article 19. 
0
 Article 12 provides that "[w]here a child has been 
wrongfully removed or retained in terms of Article 3 . . . the 
authority concerned shall order the return of the child 
forthwith."  Hague Convention, Article 12.  The Convention does 
not require that a child be returned to his or her habitual 
residence, although in the classic abduction case, this occurs. 
Where a prevailing party has moved from the child's habitual 
residence, the child is returned to that party, wherever he or 
she may be.  Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10511. 
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The rights of custody mentioned in sub-
paragraph a above, may arise in particular by 
operation of law or by reason of a judicial 
or administrative decision, or by reason of 
an agreement having legal effect under the 
law of that State. 
 
Hague Convention, Article 3.   
 For purposes of the Convention, "`rights of custody' 
shall include rights relating to the care of the person of the 
child and, in particular, the right to determine the child's 
place of residence[.]"  Hague Convention, Article 5a.  The 
conflict of laws rules as well as the internal law of the child's 
habitual residence apply in determining a parent's custody 
rights.  Elisa Perez-Vera, Explanatory Report by Elisa Perez-
Vera, in 3 Actes et documents de la Quatorzieme session 426, 445-
46 (1982).0  If a child's habitual residence is a State which has 
more than one territorial unit, the custody rights laws of the 
territorial unit apply.  Hague Convention, Article 31.0   
 Pursuant to the International Child Abduction Remedies 
Act, state and federal district courts have concurrent original 
jurisdiction of actions arising under the Convention.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 11603(a).  Any person seeking the return of a child under the 
Convention may commence a civil action by filing a petition in a 
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 Elisa Perez-Vera was the official Hague Conference 
reporter.  Her Explanatory Report is recognized as the official 
history and commentary on the Convention.  Pub. Notice 957, 51 
Fed. Reg. at 10503. 
0
 In the United States, the law in force in the state in 
which the child was habitually resident (as possibly preempted by 
the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11601 
et seq.) would apply to determine whether a removal or retention 
was wrongful.  Pub. Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. at 10506. 
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court where the child is located.  Id. § 11603(b).  The 
petitioner bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the removal or retention was wrongful under Article 
3; the respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
one of Article 13's exceptions apply.  Id. § 11603(e)(1)(A), 
(2)(A). 
 
III. 
A. 
 The question of Evan's habitual residence immediately 
prior to the retention is the threshold issue we must first 
address.0  The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction does not provide a definition for 
habitual residence; case law analyzing the term is now 
developing.  We are not, however, without guidance; the Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit and the High Court of Justice of 
the United Kingdom have considered the meaning of "habitual 
residence" in a Hague Convention case.   
 In Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 
1993), a German father filed a petition for the return of his 
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 Unlike the dissent, we believe that the determination 
of habitual residence is not purely factual, but requires the 
application of a legal standard, which defines the concept of 
habitual residence, to historical and narrative facts.  It is, 
therefore, a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a 
mixed question of law and fact.  Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. 
Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 102-03 (3d Cir. 1981).  On such 
questions we employ a mixed standard of review, accepting the 
district court's historical or narrative facts unless they are 
clearly erroneous, but exercising plenary review of the court's 
choice of and interpretation of legal precepts and its 
application of those precepts to the facts.  Id. 
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son, Thomas, alleging that Thomas' mother, a citizen of the 
United States and a member of the United States Army stationed in 
Bad Aibling, Germany, had wrongfully removed the child from 
Germany, where the family lived, to Ironton, Ohio.  A few days 
before Mrs. Friedrich left Germany with Thomas, Mr. Friedrich had 
forced his wife and child from the family's apartment and Mrs. 
Friedrich had assumed the role of Thomas' primary caretaker. 
Emphasizing her caretaking role and intentions to return 
eventually to the United States with Thomas, Mrs. Friedrich 
argued that Thomas' habitual residence had shifted from Germany 
to the United States.  The court, however, held that Germany was 
Thomas' habitual residence.  Focusing on the child, "look[ing] 
back in time, not forward[,]" and finding any future intentions 
that Mrs. Friedrich had harbored for Thomas to reside in the 
United States irrelevant to its inquiry, the court concluded that 
Thomas' habitual residence could be "`altered' only by a change 
in geography [which must occur before the questionable removal] 
and the passage of time, not by changes in parental affection and 
responsibility."  Id. at 1401-02.0   
 In Re Bates, No. CA 122-89, High Court of Justice, 
Family Div'l Ct. Royal Courts of Justice, United Kingdom (1989), 
a mother petitioned the court under the Convention for the return 
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 Having determined that Germany was Thomas' habitual 
residence, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district 
court with instructions to determine whether any of Mr. 
Friedrich's actions had terminated his custody rights under 
German law and whether any of the exceptions to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
general rule of return applied.  Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 
1396, 1403 (6th Cir. 1993). 
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of her child, Tatjana, asserting that Tatjana had been wrongfully 
removed from New York to London by the child's nanny at the 
father's request.  The father, born and raised in England, was a 
successful musician who enjoyed international fame; the mother 
was a United States citizen who shared her husband's life of 
world-wide public engagements, rehearsals and recording sessions. 
The father owned a home in London which served as the family's 
"base".  In the early part of 1989, the father's band was about 
to embark on a tour, starting with the United States, going next 
to the Far East, and ending with a stay of indefinite duration in 
London.  The parents rented or borrowed a friend's New York 
apartment, having decided that Tatjana and her mother would live 
in New York while the father was on tour.  Because Tatjana's 
speech skills were deficient for a two-and-a-half year old child, 
the mother consulted a New York speech therapist with whom she 
discussed arrangements for therapy sessions for Tatjana during 
their stay.  Toward the end of January, 1989, the family moved 
into the New York apartment.  After accompanying the father on 
various engagements in British Columbia and the United States 
during the first week of February, 1989, Tatjana, her mother and 
her nanny returned to New York, even though her father only 
reluctantly agreed to that course, preferring to have Tatjana 
return with the nanny to the London home.  Two days after the 
father's departure for the Far East, Tatjana's nanny telephoned 
him to report a heated argument with Tatjana's mother.  The 
father authorized the nanny to take Tatjana immediately to 
England, which she did. 
15 
 In her petition, the mother alleged that Tatjana's 
habitual residence was New York and that her rights of parental 
guardianship under New York law had been breached by the child's 
removal.  In deciding the question of habitual residence, the 
court initially observed that the concept is fluid, fact-infused 
and largely free from technical rules and presumptions, id. slip 
op. at 9,0 and recognized that although "[t]he residence whose 
habituality has to be established is that of the child[,] [i]n 
the case of a child as young as Tatjana, the conduct and the 
overtly stated intentions and agreements of the parents during 
the period preceding the act of abduction are bound to be 
important factors and it would be unrealistic to exclude them". 
Id. slip op. at 10.  
 In its opinion, the court set forth a governing 
principle for ascertaining the elements of habitual residence, 
which we find instructive: 
[T]here must be a degree of settled purpose. 
The purpose may be one or there may be 
several.  It may be specific or general.  All 
that the law requires is that there is a 
settled purpose.  That is not to say that the 
propositus intends to stay where he is 
indefinitely.  Indeed his purpose while 
settled may be for a limited period. 
Education, business or profession, 
employment, health, family or merely love of 
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 In Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995), a 
case arising under the Convention, the Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit was guided by this observation from Re Bates, No. 
CA 122-89, High Court of Justice, Family Div'l Ct. Royal Courts 
of Justice, United Kingdom (1989), in affirming the district 
court's treatment of the children's Swedish residence 
registration as a legal fiction of little consequence to the 
determination of their habitual residence.  Rydder, 49 F.3d at 
373. 
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the place spring to mind as common reasons 
for a choice of regular abode, and there may 
well be many others.  All that is necessary 
is that the purpose of living where one does 
has a sufficient degree of continuity to be 
properly described as settled. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 Applying this principle to the facts, the court 
concluded that because New York had acquired a "sufficient degree 
of continuity to enable it properly to be described as 
settled[,]" it was Tatjana's habitual residence within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention: 
The New York plan had acquired a more settled 
purpose by the time that the parties were in 
Seattle and Vancouver in the first few days 
of February, and the father's departure on 
his Far East tour was immediately imminent. 
New York had by then become the city in which 
the mother wanted to stay and in which the 
father had reluctantly agreed to allow her to 
stay with Tatjana, at least until the band 
returned to London in April 1989.  The extent 
to which New York would feature in their 
lives thereafter would depend very much on 
the decision which the parents then made 
about their personal lives . . . . 
 
. . . I am satisfied that the arrangements 
that had been agreed, however acrimoniously, 
before the abduction date between the two 
parents for Tatjana's care, accommodation and 
therapy treatment in New York during the 
period of three months or so that would be 
due to elapse before the father's return to 
London amounted to a purpose with a 
sufficient degree of continuity to enable it 
properly to be described as settled.     
 
Id. slip op. at 9-10.0 
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 The court then determined that the mother's rights of 
parental guardianship under New York law had been breached and 
that Tatjana's return would not expose her to a grave risk of 
17 
 Guided by the aims and spirit of the Convention and 
assisted by the tenets enunciated in Friedrich v. Friedrich and 
Re Bates, we believe that a child's habitual residence is the 
place where he or she has been physically present for an amount 
of time sufficient for acclimatization and which has a "degree of 
settled purpose" from the child's perspective.  We further 
believe that a determination of whether any particular place 
satisfies this standard must focus on the child and consists of 
an analysis of the child's circumstances in that place and the 
parents' present, shared intentions regarding their child's 
presence there.   
 When we apply our definition of habitual residence to 
the facts, we conclude that Australia was Evan's habitual 
residence immediately prior to his retention in the United States 
by Mrs. Feder.  Evan moved, with his mother and father, from 
Pennsylvania to Australia where he was to live for at the very 
least the foreseeable future, and stayed in Australia for close 
to six months, a significant period of time for a four-year old 
child.  In Australia, Evan attended preschool and was enrolled in 
kindergarten for the upcoming year, participating in one of the 
most central activities in a child's life.  Although Mr. and Mrs. 
Feder viewed Australia very differently, both agreed to move to 
that country and live there with one another and their son, and 
did what parents intent on making a new home for themselves and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
physical or psychological harm, as the father asserted. 
Accordingly, the court granted the mother's petition.  Re Bates, 
No. CA 122-89, slip op. at 11. 
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their child do -- they purchased and renovated a house, pursued 
interests and employment, and arranged for Evan's immediate and 
long-term schooling.  That Mrs. Feder did not intend to remain in 
Australia permanently and believed that she would leave if her 
marriage did not improve does not void the couple's settled 
purpose to live as a family in the place where Mr. Feder had 
found work.   
 We thus disagree with the district court's conclusion 
that the United States, not Australia, was Evan's habitual 
residence and with its analysis of the issue in several respects. 
In rejecting Australia, the court placed undue emphasis on the 
fact that the majority of Evan's years had been spent in the 
United States, ignoring the approximately six months that Evan 
lived in Australia immediately preceding his return to the United 
States and the circumstances of his life in Australia.  Moreover, 
the court disregarded the present, shared intentions of both Mr. 
and Mrs. Feder with regard to Evan's stay in Australia, focusing 
instead on Mrs. Feder exclusively and on the facts which 
indicated that she did not intend to remain in Australia if her 
marriage ended at some future date.0  Finally, we find the 
court's reliance on In re Ponath, 829 F. Supp. 363 (D. Utah 
1983), where the court found that a child was habitually resident 
in the United States as alleged by the respondent-mother, not in 
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 For essentially the same reasons, we disagree with the 
dissent's view that the United States was Evan's habitual 
residence immediately prior to the retention.  As the country of 
Evan's relatively distant past and Mrs. Feder's unilaterally 
chosen future, it does not coincide with our understanding of 
habitual residence nor satisfy the definition we have enunciated. 
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Germany as alleged by the petitioner-father, misplaced.  There, 
what began as a voluntary visit to the father's family in Germany 
by the mother and child, both of whom resided in the United 
States, turned into "coerced residence" by virtue of the verbal, 
emotional and physical abuse that the father successfully used to 
prevent his wife's and child's return to the United States.  Id. 
at 368.  Such is clearly not the case here. 
 We thus hold that Evan was habitually resident in 
Australia immediately prior to his retention by Mrs. Feder in the 
United States. 
 
B. 
 Our analysis, however, does not end here.  Having 
concluded that Evan was a habitual resident of Australia, we must 
now determine whether his retention by Mrs. Feder was wrongful 
under Article 3 of the Convention.  This determination involves 
two inquiries:  whether the custody rights Mr. Feder enjoyed 
under Australian law were breached by the retention and whether 
Mr. Feder was exercising those rights at the time.0   
 With regard to Mr. Feder's custody rights under 
Australian law, we recall that the Convention calls into play a 
State's choice of law rules as well as its internal custody 
rights laws.  See supra p. 11.  We must, therefore, initially 
determine what law Australia would apply in this case.  Among the 
                                                           
0
 We may decide both of these questions since the first 
is a question of law and the second involves an admission on Mrs. 
Feder's part.  See infra pp. 22-23. 
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documents included in the minutes of the discussions of the 
Fourteenth Session of The Hague Conference are a "Questionnaire 
on international child abduction by one parent", and the "Replies 
of the Governments to the Questionnaire".  3 Actes et documents 
de la Quatorzieme session 9, 9-11, 61, 61-129 (1982) ["Convention 
Documents"].  Australia's reply to questions 17 and 18, which ask 
respectively "[w]hat are your choice-of-law rules in child 
custody cases?" and "[a]re there any norms of constitutional or 
other fundamental law in your country which would override the 
usual choice-of-law rules in custody cases?", Convention 
Documents at 11, provides in pertinent part that  
Australian courts apply Australia's Family Law Act 1975 to 
custody questions: 
Under the Family Law Act [1975], if the court 
has jurisdiction0 to hear an application for 
custody of, or access to, a child . . . it 
applies the provisions of the Act governing 
the determination of custody and access 
applications regardless of the nationality or 
place of domicile or habitual residence of 
the child. 
 
Convention Documents at 65.  See also PETER E. NYGH, CONFLICT OF 
LAWS IN AUSTRALIA, Ch. 27 (5th ed. 1991). 
                                                           
0
 In reply to question 9 of the "Questionnaire on 
international child abduction by one parent", "[w]hat bases do 
your courts use for assuming jurisdiction in child custody 
cases?", 3 Actes et documents de la Quatorzieme session 9, 10 
(1982) ["Convention Documents"], Australia stated that under the 
Family Law Act 1975, such proceedings may be instituted if either 
party to the marriage is an Australian citizen or either party 
to, or the child of, the marriage is present in Australia. 
Convention Documents at 64. 
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 Thus, Mr. Feder's custody rights are determined by 
Australia's Family Law Act 1975, of which we may "take notice 
directly . . . without recourse to the specific procedures for 
the proof of that law. . . ."  Hague Convention, Article 14.0 
Under the Act, in the absence of any orders of court, each parent 
is a joint guardian and a joint custodian of the child,0 and 
guardianship and custody rights involve essentially the right to 
have and make decisions concerning daily care and control of the 
child.0  Family Law Act 1975 s 63(E)(1)-(2), (F)(1).  See also 
Hague Convention, Article 5a. 
                                                           
0
 We observe that the Australian court to which Mr. Feder 
made application for declarations under the Hague Convention 
applied Australia's Family Law Act 1975 to determine whether Mrs. 
Feder's retention of Evan was wrongful.  See supra p. 7.  The 
court's opinion, however, does not indicate whether a conflict of 
laws analysis was done. 
0
 Section 63(F)(1) states: 
 
Subject to any order of a court for the time 
being in force (whether or not made under 
this Act and whether made before or after the 
commencement of this section) each of the 
parents of a child who has not attained 18 
years of age is a guardian of the child and 
the parents have the joint custody of the 
child. 
 
Family Law Act 1975 s 63(F)(1). 
0
 Subsections 63E(1) and (2) provide:  
 
63E(1) [Guardianship of child]  A person who 
is the guardian of a child under this Act has 
responsibility for the long-term welfare of 
the child and has, in relation to the child, 
all the powers, rights and duties that are, 
apart from this Act, vested by law or custom 
in the guardian of a child, other than: 
 
 (a) the right to have the daily care and 
control of the child; and 
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 Turning next to the Convention's requirement that Mr. 
Feder was actually exercising the custody rights he had at the 
time of the retention, Hague Convention, Article 3b, we observe 
that Mrs. Feder conceded both in the district court and before us 
on appeal that Mr. Feder had and was exercising joint custody 
with respect to decisions concerning their son.   Accordingly, we 
hold that Mrs. Feder's unilateral decision to retain Evan in the 
United States was wrongful within the meaning of Article 3 of the 
Convention. 
 
IV. 
 As we recognized, there are exceptions to the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
general rule that a child's return is mandatory where he or she 
has been wrongfully retained by a parent.  Hague Convention, 
Article 13.  Here, Mrs. Feder raised one of the exceptions, 
asserting that Evan's return would expose him to a grave risk of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 (b) the right and responsibility to make 
decisions concerning the daily care and 
control of the child. 
 
63E(2) [Custody of child]  A person who has 
or is granted custody of a child under this 
Act has: 
 
 (a) the right to have daily care and 
control of the child; and 
 
 (b) the right and responsibility to make 
decisions concerning the daily care and 
control of the child. 
 
Family Law Act 1975 s 63(E)(1), (2). 
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psychological or physical harm or otherwise place him in an 
intolerable situation.  Hague Convention, Article 13b.  In light 
of its conclusion that Mr. Feder failed to satisfy his burden of 
proof on the threshold question, the district court did not reach 
this issue.   
 This case, therefore, must be remanded for the district 
court to consider in the first instance whether as the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act requires, Mrs. Feder 
can establish the exception by clear and convincing evidence.  42 
U.S.C. § 11603(b).  We note that the exceptions are narrowly 
drawn, lest their application undermines the express purposes of 
the Convention.  Indeed, the courts retain the discretion to 
order return even if one of the exceptions is proven.  Pub. 
Notice 957, 51 Fed. Reg. 10494, 10509 (1986).  If needed, the 
district court should supplement the record on this issue, and as 
it so appropriately did before, render its decision as 
expeditiously as is possible since time is of the essence given 
Evan's young age.   
 We also note that in order to ameliorate any short-term 
harm to the child, courts in the appropriate circumstances have 
made return contingent upon "undertakings" from the petitioning 
parent.  Thomson v. Thomson, 119 D.L.R.4th 253 (Can. Sup. 1994). 
The district court, on its own initiative, heard testimony about 
the undertakings Mr. Feder was willing to make in the event that 
Evan returned to Australia and was not accompanied by Mrs. Feder. 
Given its denial of Mr. Feder's petition, however, the court did 
not assess the need for or the adequacy of those undertakings. If 
24 
on remand the court decides that Evan's return is in order, but 
determines that Mrs. Feder has shown that an unqualified return 
order would be detrimental to Evan, the court should investigate 
the adequacy of the undertakings from Mr. Feder to ensure that 
Evan does not suffer short-term harm.  See Re O, 2 FLR 349 (U.K. 
Fam. 1994) (exacting appropriate undertakings is legitimate in 
Convention cases). 
 Finally, Mr. Feder has requested fees and costs. 
Section 11607(b)(3) of the International Child Abduction Remedies 
Act requires any court ordering the return of a child under the 
Convention to award fees and costs to the petitioner unless the 
respondent establishes that such order would be "clearly 
inappropriate".  42 U.S.C. § 11607(b)(3).  In the event that Mr. 
Feder ultimately prevails on remand, the district court should 
also consider and decide this issue. 
 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the district 
court's denial of Mr. Feder's petition and remand the case to the 
district court for further proceedings on the exception raised by 
Mrs. Feder and if necessary, on the questions of undertakings by 
Mr. Feder and his request for an award of fees and costs.  
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Feder v. Evans-Feder, No. 94-2176. 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
 I respectfully dissent, not necessarily because I 
disagree with the majority's analysis of the facts, but rather 
with the standard by which these facts are reviewed.  The issue 
presented to the district court was the determination of a four 
year-old boy's "habitual residence,"  either Jenkintown, 
Pennsylvania, where he has lived almost his entire life and where 
his mother now resides, or Sydney, Australia, where he stayed for 
five months in 1994 and his father now resides.  Resolution of 
this issue determines where the child shall reside pending 
conclusion of his parents' custody dispute. 
 The district court held an evidentiary hearing and 
ruled that the boy was habitually resident in Jenkintown.  The 
majority subjects this determination to plenary review and 
vacates the order of the district court, which likely will result 
in an order that the child be sent to Sydney where his father 
lives.  Although the majority's opinion does not and is not meant 
to resolve the ultimate issue of custody, it has immediate impact 
on the child's place of residence, and ultimately and 
realistically it will impact upon the final custody 
determination.  Where a child resides and develops ties awaiting 
a final decision on custody invariably affects that decision. 
Therefore, we should disturb the existing relationship and a 
finding of habitual residency, even on a temporary basis, with 
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great hesitancy and only when the facts and law clearly mandate 
it.   
 In my view the issue of habitual residence is 
essentially a factual one, and the findings of the district court 
should not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. 
Because I respectfully believe that the majority has established 
an incorrect standard of review, and because I would affirm the 
district court's finding as supported by the evidence and not 
clearly erroneous, I dissent. 
 
I. 
 The U.S. Senate ratified the 1980 Hague Convention on 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction ("the Convention") 
and enacted supplementary implementing legislation, the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act of 1988, 42 U.S.C.A. 
§11601 et seq. (West 1995) ("ICARA" or "the Act"), only recently, 
and thus reported cases pursuant to the Convention are relatively 
scarce.  Although three appellate decisions have reviewed ICARA 
petitions disposed of after an evidentiary hearing, none has 
enunciated an explicit standard of review.  See Prevot v. Prevot 
(In re Prevot), ___ F.3d ___, 1995 WL 413694 (6th Cir. July 14, 
1995); Rydder v. Rydder, 49 F.3d 369 (8th Cir. 1995); Friedrich 
v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993).  Hence, ours is the 
first court of appeals in the nation to analyze the appropriate 
standard of review for determinations of "habitual residence," 
and we must tread carefully because of its immediate effect upon 
the residency of the child involved. 
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 In a footnote, the majority announces that because the 
determination of habitual residence is a mixed question of fact 
and law, historical or narrative facts will be reviewed for clear 
error and the "choice and interpretation of legal precepts and 
its application of those precepts to the facts" will be subjected 
to plenary review.  Maj. Op. at ___, n.9 [typescript at 12, n.9]. 
This is certainly the proper standard for mixed questions of law 
and fact, but I cannot agree that "habitual residence" presents 
such a question. 
 Preliminarily, I remark that federal and state courts0 
have struggled over this precise issue, with some making findings 
of fact and others conclusions of law regarding a child's 
habitual residence.  Compare Wanninger v. Wanninger, 850 F.Supp. 
78, 81 (D.Mass. 1994) ("the court finds that the children were 
'habitually resident' in Germany"); Meredith v. Meredith, 759 
F.Supp. 1432, 1436 (D.Ariz. 1991) (habitual residence is finding 
of fact); David B. v. Helen O., 625 N.Y.S.2d 436, 438 ("the 
court's finding with respect to the habitual residence issue is 
dispositive") & 441 n. 3 (Fam.Ct. 1995); Roszkowski v. 
Roszkowska, 644 A.2d 1150, 1157, 274 N.J.Super. 620, 634 (Ch.Div. 
1993); Cohen v. Cohen, 158 Misc.2d 1018, 1024, 602 N.Y.S.2d 994, 
998 (Sup.Ct. 1993) (habitual residence is "factual 
determination"); with Prevot v. Prevot (In re Prevot), 855 
F.Supp. 915, 920 (W.D.Tenn. 1994) (habitual residence is 
conclusion of law), rev'd on other grounds, ___ F.3d ___, 1995 WL 
                                                           
0Under the Act, state and federal courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over ICARA petitions.  42 U.S.C.A. §11603(a). 
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413694 (6th Cir. July 14, 1995); In re Ponath, 829 F.Supp. 363, 
367 (D.Utah 1993); Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F.Supp. 264, 269 
(N.D.Iowa 1993), appeal dismissed without op., 43 F.3d 1476 (8th 
Cir. 1994); Falls v. Downie, 871 F.Supp. 100, 102 (D.Mass. 1994). 
Encompassing all, the district court here wrote that it "finds 
and concludes that the habitual residence of Charles Evan Feder 
is in the United States."  Feder v. Evans-Feder, 866 F.Supp. 860, 
868 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (emphasis added).0 
 First, "habitual residence" is not defined in either 
the Convention or the Act, and consequently one must look to the 
legislative and negotiating history.  Unfortunately, neither the 
legislative history of the Act nor the U.S. Department of State 
legal analysis submitted to the Senate by President Reagan during 
ratification reveal the proper standard of review.  See H. Report 
No. 525, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 386, 392-96; 
U.S. Department of State, Legal Analysis, Hague International 
Child Abduction Convention ("Legal Analysis"), 51 Fed.Reg. at 
10504. 
 The term is discussed in one document, however, that 
reveals its meaning to the Convention.  According to the U.S. 
Department of State, the report by the official Hague Conference 
Reporter for the Convention is "recognized by the Conference as 
the official history and commentary on the Convention."  Legal 
                                                           
0I thus think the majority errs by characterizing the district 
court as "concluding that the United States was Evan's 'habitual 
residence.'"  Maj. Op. at ___ (Typescript at __) (emphasis 
added).   
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Analysis, 51 Fed.Reg. at 10503.  This "official history and 
commentary" explains: 
'habitual residence' . . . is, in fact, a familiar 
notion of the Hague Conference, where it is understood 
as a purely factual concept, to be differentiated 
especially from that of the 'domicile.' 
Elisa Perez-Vera, "Report of the Special Commission," Conference 
de La Haye de droit international prive: Actes et documents de la 
Quatorzieme session, Vol. III, Child Abduction, ¶ 60 at 189 
(emphasis added).  Examination of a treaty's negotiating history 
is appropriate where the plain language itself is unclear.  See 
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2549, 
2565-67 (1993).  In this regard, analysis of negotiating history 
is akin to consideration of legislative history in a case of 
statutory construction.  Accordingly, the official history's 
characterization of habitual residence as "a purely factual 
concept" is powerful evidence that its drafters intended a 
determination of habitual residence to be one of fact, not of 
law. 
 Second, the jurisprudence of habitual residence has 
generally reflected the fact-bound nature of the inquiry.  The 
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have approved a British construction of 
the term: 
It is greatly to be hoped that the courts will resist 
the temptation to develop detailed and restrictive 
rules as to habitual residence, which might make it as 
technical a term of art as common law domicile.  The 
facts and circumstances of each case should continue to 
be assessed without resort to presumptions or pre-
suppositions. 
In re Bates, No. CA 122-89, slip op., High Court of Justice, 
Family Div'n Ct. Royal Courts of Justice, United Kingdom (1989), 
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at 9 (quoting Dicey and Morris, The Conflict of Laws, at 166); 
Rydder, 49 F.3d at 373; Friedrich, 983 F.2d at 1401.  See also 
Ponath, 829 F.Supp. at 365.  "The intent is for the concept 
[habitual residence] to remain fluid and fact based, without 
becoming rigid."  Levesque v. Levesque, 816 F.Supp. 662, 666 
(D.Kan. 1993).  Even the Bates decision, treated by the majority 
as authoritative, referred to a "finding of wrongful removal," 
Bates, slip op. at 9, which of course depends on a determination 
of habitual residence.  Such descriptions are consistent with my 
conviction that habitual residence is a factual finding. 
 Third, very recently the Sixth Circuit has 
characterized the question of whether a parent is exercising his 
or her custodial rights as a "finding."  Prevot, ___ F.3d at ___, 
1995 WL 413694, *11 n. 4.  The actual exercise of custodial 
rights, like "habitual residence," is an element of a 
petitioner's proof that a removal or retention was "wrongful." 
See Convention, Article 3; 42 U.S.C.A. §11603(e)(1).  I agree 
with the Sixth Circuit and perceive absolutely no reason to treat 
a determination of habitual residence, as required in Article 
3(a), as a legal conclusion, but that of the actual exercise of 
custodial rights, as required in Article 3(b), as a factual 
finding. 
 Fourth, the Act's use of the phrase "establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence" to describe a petitioner's burden 
of proving wrongful removal from a place of habitual residence 
signals that habitual residence is a fact question.  42 U.S.C.A. 
§11603(e)(1). 
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 Finally, the majority's treatment of habitual residence 
confuses "ultimate facts" with "mixed questions of fact and law." 
While an ultimate fact may depend on subsidiary findings of fact, 
it is nonetheless a factual finding and must be reviewed for 
clear error.  Pullman-Standard, Div. of Pullman, Inc. v. Swint, 
456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982).  For example, the following 
determinations have been characterized as "ultimate facts" and 
reviewed for clear error: intentional discrimination, Pullman-
Standard, 456 U.S. at 287; "more than minimal planning," United 
States v. Cianscewski, 894 F.2d 74, 83 (3d Cir. 1990); 
"equivalence" in a patent dispute, Interdynamics, Inc. v. Wolf, 
698 F.2d 157, 176 n.36 (3d Cir. 1982); and "a bankruptcy court's 
ultimate finding of fact," Bittner v. Borne Chemical Co, 691 F.2d 
134, 138 (3d Cir. 1982).  To scrutinize ultimate facts by a 
standard less deferential than that of clear error is 
"untenable," American Home Products Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, 
Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 371 (3d Cir. 1987), and to the extent our 
circuit once reviewed ultimate facts in part for legal mistake, 
"we were wrong."  Martin v. Cooper Electric Supply Co., 940 F.2d 
896, 908 n.11 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 936 (1992). 
Indeed, if the question of Evan's habitual residence had been 
submitted to a jury rather than a judge, I would doubt that we 
would set aside the same decision on the grounds that it was 
mandated as a matter of law. 
  Accordingly, I conclude that the determination of a 
child's habitual residence is best described as a factual 
finding.  I would review the district court's ruling on Evan's 
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habitual residence for clear error, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a), and I 
would not disturb it unless left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake had been committed.  Oberti v. Board of 
Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 (3d Cir. 1993).  Even if I "might have 
come to different factual conclusions based on this record, [I] 
defer to the findings of the district court unless [I am] 
convinced that the record cannot support those findings."  Id. 
 
III. 
 I agree with the majority opinion that "a child's 
habitual residence is the place where he or she has been 
physically present for an amount of time sufficient for 
acclimatization and which has a 'degree of settled purpose' from 
the child's perspective."  Maj. Op. at __ [typescript at 17]. 
Yet, "the desires and actions of the parents cannot be ignored by 
the court in making that determination when the child was at the 
time of removal or retention an infant."  Ponath, 829 F.Supp. at 
367.  Having reviewed the findings of the district court, 
however, I am not left with a "definite and firm conviction" that 
a mistake has been committed.  Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1220. 
Therefore, I would affirm. 
 I believe the habitual residence determination requires 
a weighing of those facts which indicate a settled purpose to 
reside in one location or another, as well as those which suggest 
close ties to a particular community.  As of January 8, 1994, the 
parties agreed that the scales tipped decisively in favor of 
Jenkintown as Evan's habitual residence.  Maj. Op. at ___ 
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[typescript at 8]; Feder, 866 F.Supp. at 865.  Yet as of this 
date, a number of the facts relied on by the majority had already 
been placed on the Sydney side of the balance.  As of that date: 
(a) Mr. Feder had a settled purpose to live in Australia; (b) 
Mrs. Feder had agreed to go to Australia, with Evan but "without 
any commitment to remain there," Feder, 866 F.Supp. at 863; (c) 
Mr. Feder had purchased a home in Australia for the family; (d) 
the couple had put their Jenkintown home on the market; (e) the 
couple had sold many of their household possessions in 
Pennsylvania; and (f) Mrs. Feder and Evan had temporary 
immigration status to reside in Australia.  Nonetheless, the 
parties agreed that these factors, alone or in sum, did not make 
Australia Evan's habitual residence, absent some dispositive 
subsequent conduct.   
 The question thus becomes, what if anything occurred in 
the subsequent five and one-half months sufficient to alter the 
balance?  The district court carefully canvassed the evidence 
introduced at the hearing and determined that it was insufficient 
to alter the balance that existed before Mrs. Feder and Evan 
traveled to Sydney.  The court observed that Mrs. Feder had 
obtained one day of employment, a single performance with the 
Sydney Opera, scheduled for thirteen months after her arrival; 
Evan attended pre-school part-time, enrolled in kindergarten for 
the upcoming year, and was placed on a waiting list for a private 
school; and Mrs. Feder and Evan had obtained Australian Medicare 
cards.  Feder, 866 F.Supp. at 864.  On the other hand, unlike her 
husband, Mrs. Feder declined to surrender her Pennsylvania 
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driver's license or to obtain an Australian one.  Nor did she or 
Evan submit to the physical examination necessary to acquire 
permanent immigration status in Sydney, or sign any papers in 
support of the application Mr. Feder filed on their behalf.  Id. 
These events, all comparatively trivial, do not persuade me that 
the district court committed clear error.  Rather, they seem to 
confirm that Mr. Feder always had a settled purpose to reside in 
Sydney, but Mrs. Feder arrived without a settled purpose to 
remain, and departed never having developed one.  Nor do these 
events indicate anything about Evan's own intentions. 
 I agree with the majority that there is a temporal 
element to this inquiry.  For example, two weeks in Australia 
certainly would not suffice for Evan to establish a habitual 
residence there, and after two years his mother would have been 
hard put to argue that Jenkintown remained his home.  Moreover, 
given that "habitual residence" should not be over-encumbered 
with legal rules, I would not establish a bright-line time period 
necessary to establish residence.  Yet I cannot conclude that 
five and one-half months is so obviously sufficient that I would 
reverse the district court's finding as clearly erroneous.  In 
this regard, I note that Article 12 of the Convention directs 
that even when a child has been wrongfully removed from his 
habitual residence, if the child has spent a year (prior to the 
filing of the petition) in a new location, return may be thwarted 
by a demonstration that the child "is now settled."  Thus in 
another context, the Convention recognizes that at least one year 
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must pass before a child can be sufficiently "settled" so as to 
affect the location where custody will be adjudicated. 
 In addition, as of the date of the alleged wrongful 
removal, Evan had lived far longer in Jenkintown than in Sydney. 
While it may be that Mr. Feder had, and Mrs. Feder did not have, 
a settled purpose to reside in Sydney, it is significant that 
Evan stayed with his mother in Jenkintown until she left, 
travelling to Sydney only when she did.  This indicates some 
correspondence between the purposes of mother and child.  While 
it is virtually impossible to ascertain the settled purpose of 
such a young child, it is more closely aligned here to that of 
the mother.  That is not meant to indicate that the mother's 
purpose should necessarily predominate, but rather that the facts 
of this matter support that conclusion.  
 Finally, we must be mindful of the consequence of a 
reversal here, since it will likely result in an order for the 
child's return to Australia, unless Mrs. Feder can prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that Evan would be at "grave risk" were 
he returned to Sydney.  Absent such proof, the child will be 
taken from his mother's home in Jenkintown, where he has spent 
virtually all of his years, in contrast to the time spent with 
his father in Australia.  Since this ruling is temporary pending 
a custody adjudication, he may again be ordered back to the 
United States.  Although the best interests of the child will be 
determined ultimately, they should not be ignored in these 
preliminary proceedings.  Such tugging and shuttling can only be 
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detrimental.  Thus, absent clearly erroneous fact-finding by the 
district court, its ruling should remain undisturbed.   
 Accordingly, I would affirm the district court's 
finding that Evan's habitual residence is the United States.0 
                                                           
0I add a note to endorse the majority's suggestion that, in the 
event the district court determines a return order would pose no 
"grave risk" to Evan but would nonetheless be detrimental to him, 
the court may evaluate the adequacy of undertakings offered by 
Mr. Feder.  Maj. Op. at ___ [typescript at 24].  The "permissible 
involvement" of a court deciding a petition "extends beyond 
bluntly saying that there shall be a return or that there shall 
not.  The court can influence the outcome by making clear that 
without undertakings, or with only the undertakings that are 
offered, Art[icle] 13(b) will apply, but that further or other 
undertakings are a prerequisite for a child's return."  Re O, 2 
FLR 349 (U.K. Fam.Div. 1994).  The district court may, for 
example, require Mr. Feder to pay for mother and child to fly 
back to Sydney, permit them to live at the former matrimonial 
home while he lives elsewhere, and provide them with a car and 
living expenses.  Id.  The district court may also need to 
investigate whether undertakings offered in the United States 
would be binding and enforceable in Australia, if their 
implementation is necessary to avoid "grave risk" to the child 
returned.  See id. 
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